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Forty years after these observations were made, it would be useful to examine which of the psychological conditions that Sennett counts as the legacy of the 19 th century have in fact survived not only the passage of time but also, and perhaps more relevantly, the emergence in the intervening years of a whole new mode of public intercourse -namely, computer-mediated interaction. This is the tack that I would like to follow in this essay, building on Sennett's insights and extending them to the current moment. My proposition is that this new mode of interaction has amplified two of those psychological conditions (involuntary disclosure and superimposition of public and private life) and suppressed the other two (withdrawal and silence). In so doing, it has also
given rise to what I call the ‚alter-sphere' -the product of a new regime of engagement with the world that is not supplanting, but displacing, the public and private spheres, pushing against their boundaries with vehement force. Modern technologies have something to do with these shifts, but in no way, I hasten to add, can they fully explain them. We 2 Defoe (1724), 308.
3 Lord Chesterfield (1774), 80.
4 Sennett (1977), 68. need, rather, to look for an explanation at the broader social, economic, and cultural shifts of the last few decades. In fact, to see how we got here, we have to step even further back and take a closer look at the changing relationship of public and private life in the last three centuries.
Theatrum Mundi : Public Life in the 18 th Century
Traditional residents of major European cities in the 18 th century, facing the increasing presence of outsiders in their streets, parks, and parlors, found themselves at loss and confusion. A "motley mass" of "amorphous" and "questionable", and "unformed" character is how Daniel
Defoe described these newcomers to the city of London, the population of which had more than doubled between mid-17 th and mid-18 th centuries.
2 London itself, during that same period, was often described as a ,Great Wen' -an open sore that exudes all kinds of filthy fluid. How did
Londoners deal with this situation?
We get clues to an answer by the advice that Lord Chesterfield gave to his son in a letter dated 1747:
People of your age have, commonly, unguarded frankness about them [sic] which makes them the easy prey and bubbles of the artful and the experienced […] . Beware, therefore, now that you are coming into the world, of these proffered friendships. Receive them with great civility, but with great credulity too; and pay them with compliments but not with confidence.
3
The prudent father, in other words, counsels the unguarded son to take "people as they are and not as they probably are" 4 , giving voice to a growing sensibility that treated the public sphere as a theater stage where people adopted roles that did not necessarily reflect their true status, emotions, and selves. It was this sensibility that allowed people of all classes to take liberty in violating the sumptuary laws that had hitherto assigned ‚appropriate' clothes to each social class and that had been rigorously observed and enforced in the past.
In this way, the disoriented denizens of big cities found a way to socialize among a growing number of strangers without probing into each other's personal lives. Conversations that they held together in parks and cafes turned, thus, into an exchange of signs rather than symbols, lacking as they did in any reference to taste, rank, origin, and so forth. Providing people with social masks, these conversations sought to resolve a seeming paradox between an inner private life as the realm of the natural and the public as that of the cultural and conventional.
6 Sennett (1977) , 25.
7 Sennett (1977) , 27; Balzac (1829), 32.
That pastoralist perspective disappeared, by and large, from the social scene of the following century, only to emerge in distorted form later on -for instance, among those of us who seek to "get back in touch" with ourselves by leaving the city, taking refuge in the countryside. The result was that the line between private feeling and its public display could be erased beyond the power of the will to regulate. The boundary between public and private was no longer of a resolute human hand; thus, even as the separate reality of the public realm remained believable, its governance no longer seemed a social act. What is today popularly misnamed "unconscious" behavior was foreshadowed by these ideas of involuntary disclosure of character in public.
6
As a defense mechanism against this vulnerability, the bourgeoisie and, under its ideological sway, increasingly other urban classes resorted to silence and withdrawal as defense mechanisms. "Silence in public became", in this fashion, "the only way one could experience public life." Furthermore, " [t] his invisible wall of silence as a right meant that knowledge in public was a matter of observation -of scenes, of locales, of other men and women. Knowledge was no longer to be produced by social intercourse", rather through a kind of voyeurism that as passive observers and as bearers of personal judgment. The social actor of the previous century was now the passive spectator of not only elaborate shop windows but also of social events in general. Karl Marx's prophecy about "commodity fetishism" -the mystification that would turn every object into a "social hieroglyph" -had finally come to pass in this environment.
8
The moral demands of this new social life were much tighter than the theatrum mundi of the previous era. Puritan and Protestant ethics simply asked too much of individuals, who responded to it with withdrawal from social life. It was such that the liberal notion of privacy as ‚the right to be let alone' was born. The private was now the world where human interactions took place most intensively, but also most secretly. Three Regimes of Engagement with the World: The Personal, the Functional, and the Alter Regimes
For starters, an inquiry into the current situation must work within a relational scheme that theorizes individuals' orientations to the world if we are to understand our relations with digital technology, in which the aggregate is not a given but the outcome of a cascade of individual judgments and decisions. We need a framework to understand and explain contemporary social life that is based not only on norms, habits, and practices, but that reveals how far the effects of activities extend, how they reach known and unknown others, and how aware and informed subjects are of the effects of their activities.
In constructing such a framework, I would like to draw on the work of the French sociologist Laurent Thévenot who argues that, "in our contemporary societies human beings constantly need to change the scope of their engagement, shifting along a scale between greater or lesser generality". 13 Thévenot provides a broad account of this scope in
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In a similar vein, I propose to think of human relationships with digital technologies as occurring within broadly scoped ‚regimes of engagement'. Each regime is characterized by relations between an individual, other actors, and a set of rules that govern activity within the regime. A close examination of these relations suggests that in the present environment three such regimes are at work: the personal, the functional, and the alter regimes. In each, we notice (1) the extent to which the individual is a subject or object -that is, their degree of agency and control over the engagement; (2) other actors present, and whether they are relevant and known to the individual; and (3) the set of rules that govern activities in the regime, the way the rules are set, and whether they are known to the individual. A regime, of course, is a model of engagement with the world, and therefore a simplification. There are always exceptions, gradations, ‚whiter shades of pale', and other refinements and tunings, but overall, the regimes allow us to theorize how individuals act in a complex mediated world.
The personal regime is the simplest, and perhaps the most familiar.
Within it, the individual is an active, motivated subject playing by their own rules, dealing with known others in the context of well-developed personal, reciprocal relationships, situated in a world to which they are accustomed, one that feels ordinary, or even ‚natural'. Although one can argue that historically certain activities have typified each regime -a condition that is now changing with digital technology -one can say that the personal regime has centered on activities related to family, health, friendship, romance, marriage, personal finance, hobbies, sports, birth, and death. The drivers of activity, as such, take on an intimate character connecting family and friends, supporting wellness and wellbeing, procreating, cooking, playing, entertaining, and furnishing and maintaining one's personal environment. The rules of engagement in the personal regime are set by mutual understanding and often with individual consent. This is where the "tyranny of intimacy", which Sennett identified in the 20 th century, is validly in place.
The functional regime is more complex. Within it, the individual is a ‚subject-object' -that is, in some instances an active motivated subject, and in others, objectified within the goals and activities of oth-figurationen no. 01/ 18
15 Cf. Foucault (1977) .
ers. Objectification is a relation involving at least one other actor who reductively refigures the fully motivated, active subject.
While the people and institutions of the functional regime are familiar and known, they are not as intimately woven into the individual's life as in the personal regime. Reciprocity is formalized, and activities are driven by the need to conduct a functionally effective life in modern society: to become an educated person, to acquire skills and employment, to make and manage money, to obtain insurance (health, home, automobile, and so on), to plan for aging and retirement, to pay taxes, to vote, to attend to the needs of one's local communities (such as civic, religious, and so on). Actors in the functional regime are demarcated by their formal and functional relation to the individual, and play by well-defined rules. Individuals no longer set their own rules, but accede to those of others, such as schools or employers or governments. These rules are not always completely visible to the individual, however, in part because of their complexity. The individual may not encounter a particular rule unless they inadvertently violate it.
As Michel Foucault has extensively demonstrated, the ‚subject-object' of the functional regime is produced by the needs of modern societies and their institutions to objectify, for their own purposes, while at the same time, having to deal with actual individual persons.
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The government, for example, reductively defines a ‚voter' as someone who has citizenship, has registered to vote, and has a valid address.
But this voter may appear in person at a local voting station, and their needs for physical privacy (the voting booth), a place to stand and wait, and so on, must be taken into account. Or, an employee is monetized through an annual salary or hourly wage, and objectified according to the set of skills they can perform. But the employee may be acknowledged in workplace interactions as a person -someone who is musically talented or athletic or who grows prize-winning roses. Employees play by employers' rules, but the operation of such rules can be challenged through moral censure or legal action.
In the alter regime, finally, the individual is objectified in the schemes of other actors who are largely unknown to them. A person who donates to a crowdfunding campaign, for example, is a dollar amount within the bounds of the transaction, with no other attributes. The rules of play are clearly spelled out, and the donor accepts them. The donor decides how much to contribute, and has willingly participated in their own objectification to support a cause. This has largely to do with the conspicuous absence of rules of behavior, which leads to the surprising outcomes that may be produced in the alter regime, such as the U. S.
National Security Agency's clandestine activities.
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The Integrity of Tightly Coupled Regimes
The three regimes of engagement differ in important ways. Specifically, they vary in terms of (1) the individual's position on the subject-object continuum; (2) the individual's knowledge of other actors (persons or institutions) and their agendas and intentions; (3) the rules by which the individual has to play; and (4) the extent to which relations between the individual and other actors within an activity are reciprocal ( Increasing use of digital technology, however, allows increasing traffic and movement, with individuals, activities, and social relations shifting across regimes. In the first instance, individuals may shift in and out of regimes, typically responding to the predicaments of daily life (isolation, monotony, precarity, etc.). In the second instance, whole activities shift from one regime to another, with practices that have traditionally belonged to one regime manifested in others -e. g., sharing personal stories on social media that are accessible to actors in the functional or alter regimes. Finally, and often as a result of the first two movements, in the third instance social relations slide back and forth across regimes, with agents from one regime ‚reaching across' to another regime, inserting themselves into activities of the latter.
Regimes thus become tightly coupled to one another. Far from being autonomous and separate, they become increasingly linked through digital technology -an observation that has led some commentators to lament about the loss of privacy, and others to question the integrity of ‚contexts' and to conclude that boundaries have collapsed.
18 While the motivating concerns of these views are understandable, their conclusions are not, based as they are on narrow views of privacy, of social life, and, perhaps most importantly, of the relation between these and the displacements of capitalism. I contend that regimes, despite their tight coupling, maintain a great deal of integrity. In fact, contemporary human beings may have to put considerable effort into defending the integrity of the regimes in which they participate. This dual character of regimes -at once distinctive and recognizable, but also prone to the movements described above -creates tensions that individuals and institutions seek to resolve.
Computing technology features centrally in how these tensions play themselves out. Although not technologically determined, regimes do vary in how computer technologies enable or constrain them. Therefore, on the one hand, the way technology mediates human activities varies across regimes, and, on the other, the universal character of computers facilitates cross-regime movement. 19 The movements are made possible because of the ease with which information flows across electronic networks. The network itself is a featureless terrain of moving bits, but the activities-in-the-world the information feeds are the distinctive, particular, highly featured terrains of the personal, functional, and alter regimes.
The intersection of uniformly flowing bits and non-uniform human activities with their specific ‚outcroppings' across which the bits flow, leads to both the potentials and contradictions of life lived in a digital
world. As such, regimes are not effaced by digital technology, but linked in particular ways we can observe and analyze.
To that end, next I discuss movements across regimes in terms of the flow of activities, the changing relational distance between social actors, and how these, in turn, affect the contemporary individual.
Flow of Activity Across Regimes: Outward Flows and Inward Flows
Digital technology allows the individual subject to rapidly shift between activities that belong to various regimes. The traffic is two-way, going outward from the personal to the functional and the alter regimes, and inward in the opposite direction. In either case, the free flow of bits allows activities once sequestered in physical enclosures to spread to new arenas of activity. In contrast to physical enclosures that characterized Foucault's disciplinary structures of early modernity, current regimes are no longer as coincident with physical space as they used to be, and specific mechanisms are in place to enable and promote these flows. In the same fashion that mechanisms such as examination enabled control in the prisons, schools, and factories of early modernity 20 , specific mechanisms are at work in sustaining traffic across regimes. These include, but are not limited to, mechanisms of affective rewards such as social connection, self-promotion, micro-validation, totalized stimulation, and broad infor- In a more commercially oriented environment such as Amazon
Me chanical Turk, work has shifted from the functional to the alter regime, mediating the labor relation through digital technology. Mechanical
Turk is a way to fuel growth of capital through reducing labor costs.
Employees are objectified as computational components performing human intelligence tasks. Objectification is rather complete; employees are not persons, but codified only as tasks that costs a certain amount.
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The temporary, low-wage contracts lure those experiencing the precarity of contemporary capitalism and the attendant monotony of daily life, though remuneration from completing the tasks is so small. Within this ruthless program of reduction and quantification, employees have no legal recourse to challenge the way employers play the game.
In some cases, individuals' self-exposure seems naïvely outlandish.
The U. S. Congressman Michael Weiner of New York, for instance, incurred public ridicule by sharing indecent photos on social media.
He had been a popular member of Congress for seven terms before he clicked the wrong button on Twitter, sending a photo intended for a small number of individuals to his entire feed.
Flow across regimes can also take place in the opposite direction.
In work environments, using technologies such as instant messaging, figurationen no. 01/ 18
24 The same dynamic prevails in the university classroom where students (often successfully) shift to the personal regime, reading email, playing games, shopping, and otherwise removing themselves from the functional regime through the affordances of digital technology.
25 Cf. Blitzer (2014).
for example, workers may slip out of the functional regime momentarily, perhaps responding to predicaments of monotony or separation.
Employees look for opportunities to shift to activity in the personal regime, however fleeting such activity might be during the workday. The folk term ,NSFW' (not safe for work) marks the salience of the personal versus functional regimes. Employees use such labels to warn others in advance about the nature of digital content they are sharing which is more properly part of the personal regime.
At the same time, employers are attempting to prevent slippage across regimes, and to discipline employees to fulfill the instrumental purposes set for them. 
